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ABSTRACT 
The paper features a number of new generic principles for reducing technical risk with a very wide 
application area. Permutations of interchangeable components/operations in a system can reduce 
significantly the risk of system failure at no extra cost. Reducing the time of exposure and the space of 
exposure can also reduce risk significantly.  
Technical risk can be reduced effectively by introducing inverse states countering negative effects 
during service. The application of this principle in logistic supply networks leads to a significant 
reduction of the risk of congestion and delays. The associated reduction of transportation costs and 
environmental pollution has the potential to save billions of dollars to the world economy. 
Separation is a risk-reduction principle which is very efficient in the cases of separating functions 
to be carried out by different components and for blocking out a common cause. Segmentation is a 
generic principle for risk reduction which is particularly efficient in reducing the load distribution, 
vulnerability to a single failure, the hazard potential and damage escalation. 
 
Keywords: Generic principles, risk reduction, reliability improvement; technical risk.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite the critical importance of distilling generic principles related to reducing technical risk, very 
little has been published on this topic. For a long time, the principles of technical risk reduction have 
been exclusively focused within specific industries, technologies or operations, for example: oil and 
gas industry, nuclear industry, aviation, construction, medicine, banking, welding, heat treatment, 
machining, casting, forging, transportation, handling poisonous substances, handling heavy loads, etc.  
These risk reduction principles tend to be oriented towards avoiding or mitigating particular failure 
modes in the specific application area and usually have no general validity. A similar feature 
characterises even principles of technical risk reduction related to commonly occurring failure modes 
across various engineering disciplines, for example, principles related to fatigue and fast fracture of 
engineering components (Ewalds & Wanhill, 1984; Hertzberg, 1996; Zahavi & Torbilo 1996; 
Anderson, 2005). 
Reliability engineering usually focusses on predicting the reliability of components and systems 
and does not normally discuss principles for reliability improvement. Improving reliability by active 
and standby 'redundancy', by strengthening the weakest link, by developing physics-of-failure models, 
by eliminating a common cause and by reducing variability for example, are generic risk reduction 
principles that have been covered well in the reliability literature (Barlow & Proschan 1975; Ebeling, 
1997; O'Connor, 2003; Lewis, 1996; Todinov, 2007). There exists a rather simplistic view among 
some reliability practitioners that improving the reliability of a system involves either improving the 
reliability of the components or providing redundancy. Equally simplistic is the view that only 
developing physics of failure models can deliver reliability improvement. This view has been fuelled 
by the failure of some reliability models to predict correctly the life of engineering components. A 
possible contributing reason is the widespread erroneous view that the quality and utility of reliability 
models depends strongly on the availability of failure data. Comparative statistical models however, 
based on assumed input data, can deliver real reliability improvement in the absence of any failure 
data. For example, in comparing the performance of competing network topologies and selecting the 
topology with the best performance, a comparative method for assessing the performance of 
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competing network topologies could proceed by: (i) assuming common flow capacities, failure 
frequencies, and repair times for the corresponding components/edges of the compared networks; (ii) 
determining the performance of the competing networks by using an appropriate software tool and 
finally (iii) selecting the best-performing topology. 
These extreme views demonstrate unnecessary self-imposed constraints. Increasing reliability can 
be achieved by using principles which range widely from pure statistical modelling to pure physics-
of-failure modelling underpinning the reliable operation and failure. 
The risk literature (Vose 2002; Aven 2003; Bedford & Cooke) is oriented towards risk modelling, 
risk assessment, risk management and decision making and there is very little discussion related to 
generic principles for reducing technical risk. 
The Taguchi's experimental method for robust design through testing (Phadke 1989) achieves 
designs where the performance characteristics are insensitive to variations of control (design) 
variables. This method can be considered to be an important step towards formulating the generic risk 
reduction principle of robust design whose performance characteristics are insensitive to variations of 
design parameters. 
French (1999) formulated a number of generic principles to be followed in conceptual design, but 
they were not necessarily oriented towards reducing technical risk. Generic principles to be followed 
in engineering design have been discussed in Pahl 2007. Most of the discussed principles however are 
either not related to reducing the risk of failure or are too specific (e.g. the principle of thermal 
design), with no general validity. Collins (2003) discussed engineering design with a failure 
prevention perspective. The formulated generic guidelines to be followed by engineer-designers 
however were given in a specific context of mechanical design and no generic principles for reducing 
technical risk were formulated. An interesting classification of human errors and methods for 
reducing human errors has been made in Dhillon and Singh (1981) which again do not have general 
validity.  
The struggle between the need of increasing efficiency and reducing the weight of components and 
systems and reliability is a constant source of technical and physical contradictions. Hence, it is no 
surprise that several principles for resolving technical contradictions formulated by Altshuller in the 
development of TRIZ methodology for inventive problem solving (Altshuller, 1984,1996, 1999) can 
also be used for reducing technical risk. Eliminating harmful factors and influences is the purpose of 
many inventions and Altshuller's TRIZ system captured a number of useful generic design principles 
closely related to eliminating harm.  
Most of the generic principles for technical risk reduction however, are routed in the reliability and 
risk theory and cannot be deduced from the general inventive principles formulated in TRIZ, which 
serve as a general guide in developing inventive solutions, as an alternative to the trial-and-error 
approach. Some principles for technical risk reduction rely on concepts like 'robust fault-tolerant 
design' with reduced sensitivity to the variation of reliability-critical design parameters; other 
principles are based on guaranteeing with large probability minimum separation intervals between 
random events (Todinov, 2004). 
Some principles are rooted in the logic of operation of devices and the logic of execution of 
operations ('Failure prevention interlocks'); other principles rely on specific systematic methods for 
discovery and elimination of failure modes. Contrary to what some authors stated, optimisation is not 
necessarily about finding a compromise between several parameters to maximise a particular system 
output. Thus, producing a robust engineering assembly, whose characteristics are insensitive to the 
variation of the parameters characterising the system's components can be achieved not only by 
finding appropriate mean values for the component parameters within a selected design. A robust 
(optimised) engineering assembly can also be created by departing radically from the selected design 
and selecting a new assembly design exhibiting less sensitivity of its characteristics to variations of 
the parameters characterising the components. 
The systematic distilling, formulating and classifying of generic principles for reducing technical 
risk was started in (Todinov 2007) where the principles for risk reduction have been divided into: 
'preventive' - reducing mainly the likelihood of failure; 'protective' - reducing mainly the 
consequences from failure and 'dual' - oriented towards reducing both the likelihood of failure and the 
consequences from failure. The formulated set of principles however is by no means comprehensive.  
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In this paper, a number of new generic principles for risk reduction with very wide application area 
are proposed which, to the best of our knowledge, have never been reported before. The unifying 
feature of the presented principles is that they are truly universal and can be applied in diverse areas 
of the human activity, for example in environmental sciences, project management, logistics supply, 
financial engineering, economics, medicine, etc. 
The presented set of principles prompts risk managers not to limit themselves within few familiar 
ways of improving reliability and reducing risk which often leads to solutions which are far from 
optimal. Using appropriate combinations of diverse principles often brings a considerably larger 
effect. 
PERMUTATIONS OF INTERCHANGEABLE COMPONENTS AND PROCESSES 
Consider the system in Figure 1 which transports cooling liquid from three sources s1,s2 and s3 to the 
chemical reactor t.  
The cooling system consists of identical pipeline sections (the arrows in Figure 1). Each pipeline 
section is coupled with a pump for transporting the cooling fluid through the section. Suppose that the 
pipeline sections and the pumps are old and prone to failure due to corrosion, fatigue, wear, 
deteriorated seals, etc. The cooling system fulfils its mission if at least one cooling line delivers 
cooling fluid to the chemical reactor. Suppose for the sake of simplicity that all pipeline sections are 
in the same state of deterioration and each section is characterized with the same reliability 4.0 , 
associated with one year of operation. Because of the deteriorated sections, the cooling system will 
benefit from risk-reduction consisting of purchasing and replacing deteriorated pipeline sections with 
new sections. Consequently, the replacement of any of the 9 pipeline sections is a possible risk-
reduction option. Now suppose that the available budget is sufficient for purchasing and replacing 
exactly 3 pipeline sections. Each new pipeline section is characterised by a reliability 0.9 for one year 
of operation. 
Because of the symmetry of the system in Figure 1a, the replacement of any pipeline section is 
associated with the removal of the same amount of system risk. The pipeline sections work 
independently from one another and because all of them are identical, it seems that any three pipeline 
sections can be replaced with new ones (Figure 1b), with the same effect. 
This impression however is incorrect. The total removed risk of system failure is highest if the 
available budget is spent preferentially on replacing pipeline sections forming an entire cooling 
branch (Figure 1c), as opposed to replacing randomly selected sections inside the system (Figure 1b). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A safety-critical cooling system consisting of three parallel branches 
 
Indeed, the reliability of the parallel-series arrangement in Figure 1b is: 
373.0)9.04.01(1 32 =×−−=bR                                             (1) 
while the reliability of the parallel-series arrangement in Figure 1c is significantly higher: 
76.0)9.01()4.01(1 323 =−×−−=cR                                         (2) 
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The variant presented in Figure 1c is an example of a well-ordered parallel-series system. A well-
ordered parallel-series arrangement is obtained if the available components are used to build the 
branch with the highest possible reliability, the remaining components are used to build the next 
branch with the highest possible reliability and so on, until the entire parallel-series arrangement is 
built. 
If there are three types of branches with different age: new, medium and old branches, the maximum 
reliability is achieved if all new components are arranged in a single branch, the medium age 
components in another branch and all old-age components are grouped in a separate branch (Figure 
2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Minimising the risk of failure of a parallel-series system by permutation of 
interchangeable components 
 
Parallel-series arrangements are very common. Consider a safety-critical system for detecting the 
release of toxic gas, based on n detectors working in parallel. Upon a toxic gas release, the system 
detects the critical event if at least one of the detectors working in parallel detects the toxic gas 
release. This system is often a parallel-series system because the parts building the separate detectors 
are logically arranged in series. 
The result stated for the maximum reliability of well-ordered parallel-series systems has been 
verified by a computer simulation. The computer simulation consisted of specifying the reliabilities of 
the interchangeable components in the branches and calculating the reliability of the well-ordered 
system. The second phase of the validation program is a “random scrambling” of the interchangeable 
components in the branches, by generating random indices of components from different branches 
and swapping their reliability values. The swapping guarantees that any resultant system includes 
exactly the same set of interchangeable components as the initial system. After the ‘random 
scrambling’, the reliability of the scrambled system was calculated and compared with the reliability 
of the well-ordered system. If the reliability of the well-ordered system was greater than or equal to 
the reliability of the scrambled system, the content of a counter was increased. At the end, the 
probability that the well-ordered system has reliability not smaller than the reliability of the scrambled 
system was calculated. In all of the conducted simulations, this probability was always equal to one, 
which confirms that well-ordered systems are indeed characterised by the largest 
reliability/availability. 
These results can be summarised by stating a generic risk-reduction principle: The well-ordered 
parallel-series system is characterised by the smallest possible risk of failure. 
 
Proof. This principle will be proved by a contradiction and the extreme principle. Suppose that there 
is a system which is not well-ordered and which possesses the highest possible reliability. Without 
loss of generality, suppose that the branches in this system have been re-arranged in such a way that 
for any two branches ‘i’, ‘j’ for which ji < , the branch with index ‘i’ is equally reliable or more 
reliable than branch ‘j’ ( ji RR ≥ ). If the system is not a well-ordered system, then there will be two 
branches a and b with reliabilities ba RR ≥ , where there will be at least one component in branch b 
with a larger reliability than the reliability of the analogous interchangeable component in branch a. 
Suppose that naa aaaR ××= ...21  and nbb bbbR ××= ...21  are the reliabilities of branches a and b and 
na , nb  are the number of components in branches a and b, correspondingly. Without loss of 
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generality, suppose that the two analogous interchangeable components mentioned earlier, are the last 
components in the branches a and b ( nbna ba < ). 
The reliability of the initial system can be presented as 
]1[)...1)(...1(1 21211 restnbnasys RbbbaaaR −×××−××−−=                      (3) 
where restR  is the reliability of the rest of the parallel-series arrangement. 
After swapping components naa  and nbb , the reliability of the resultant system becomes 
]1[)...1)(...1(1 1211212 restnanbnbnasys RabbbbaaaR −×××−××−−= −−              (4) 
Subtracting (4) from (3) yields: 
]1[)......)(( 12112121 restnbnanbnasyssys RbbbaaabaRR −×××−××−=− −−                (5) 
Because nbbnaa bbbRaaaR ××=≥××= ...... 2121  by the way the branches have been arranged in 
descending order according to their reliability ( ba RR ≥ ), and because nbna ba <  (by assumption), the 
inequality  
121121 ...... −− ××>×× nbna bbbaaa                                               (6) 
holds, which means that in equation (5) 0...... 121121 >××−×× −− nbna bbbaaa .  
Since 01 >− restR , the right hand side of equation (5) is negative, which means that the resultant 
system (after the swap of components) has a higher reliability. This contradicts the assumption that 
the initial system (before the swap) was the system with the highest possible reliability. Therefore the 
reliability of a system which is not well-ordered, can be improved by swapping components between 
parallel branches until a well-ordered system is finally obtained. A well-ordered system is unique and 
there can be no two well-ordered systems. Because a parallel-series system can either be a well-
ordered or not well-ordered system, the well-ordered system has a higher reliability compared to any 
other arrangement. The risk-reduction principle has been justified. 
This principle provides an opportunity to remove the maximum amount of system risk by 
concentrating the available budget on renewing single parallel branches as opposed to randomly 
replacing aged components in the system. 
This result also provides the valuable opportunity to improve the reliability of common systems 
with parallel-series logical arrangement of their components without the knowledge of their 
reliabilities and without any investment. Unlike all traditional approaches, which invariable require 
resources to achieve reliability improvement and risk reduction, a system risk reduction can also be 
achieved by appropriate permutation of the available interchangeable components in the parallel 
branches. 
Components of similar level of deterioration (reliability levels) should be placed in the same 
parallel branch (see the example from Figure 2).  
The risk reduction principle based on permutation of interchangeable components has wide 
applications reaching far beyond its initial engineering context. 
Consider a common example where three groups of people (teams) 1, 2 and 3, each of which 
includes three independently working team members. The teams work in parallel towards achieving 
the same goal (Figure 3a). The goal is achieved if at least one of the teams succeeds in achieving the 
goal. Within each team, the task of achieving the goal is divided into subtasks among the team 
members. Every single person in a team must accomplish their sub-task successfully, in order for the 
team to achieve the goal. The level of training of each team member is from one of the categories: 
Strong (S), Weak (W) and Medium (M). A person with strong level of training has a better chance of 
accomplishing a task successfully compared to a person with medium training or weak training. A 
person with medium training has a better chance of accomplishing the task successfully compared to a 
person with weak training. 
Separating the people in groups with similar level of training (Figure 3b) yields the highest chance 
of achieving the goal. Note that reducing the risk of not achieving the goal has been achieved at no 
extra cost. 
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Figure 3. Three groups of people working towards achieving the same goal 
 
TIME OF EXPOSURE AND SPACE OF EXPOSURE 
Reducing risk by reducing the time of exposure  
Suppose that a particular hazard is characterised by a cumulative distribution function )(xFH  of its 
magnitude (impact). The hazard appears during a finite time interval with length t and the times of 
hazard occurrence follow a homogeneous Poisson process with intensity ρ . Suppose that the 
resistance to the hazard (the strength) is characterised by a probability density distribution )(xfS . It 
is also assumed that the hazard and the resistance are statistically independent. The probability that 
during the finite time interval with length t, there will be no critical hazard impact exceeding a 
specified resistance x, is given by )exp( tcrρ− , where crρ  is the number density of the hazard 
occurrence. The number density of the critical hazard occurrences (the occurrences where the hazard 
magnitude exceeds the resistance x) is given by )](1[ xFHcr −×= ρρ , where ρ  is the number 
density of the hazard occurrences and )(1 xFH−  is the probability that a hazard occurrence will be 
critical (will exceed the resistance x). Consequently, the probability )(0 xp  that during the finite time 
interval with length t, there will be no critical hazard occurrences for which the resistance x is 
exceeded, is given by 
))](1[exp()(0 txFxp H−×−= ρ                                               (7) 
The probability that the resistance will be in the infinitesimal interval x, x+dx is given by dxxfS )(
. Assuming that the hazard occurrence does not depend on resistance, the probability that an entity 
with resistance in the interval x, x+dx will survive all hazard occurrences on the time interval 0,t is 
given as a product of the probabilities of statistically independent events 
dxxfxpoccurenceshazardallsurvivewillxresistP S )()().( 0 ×=           (8) 
where )(0 xp  is given by equation (7). 
If minS  and maxS  are the lower and upper limit of resistance, the probability of surviving all 
random hazard occurrences during the time interval 0,t is given by 
∫ −−=
max
min
)())](1(exp[)(
S
S
SH dxxfxFttR ρ                                           (9) 
The probability of no failure (the reliability) associated with the finite time interval (0,t) can then 
be calculated from the integral in equation (9).  
The probability of failure fp  is simply 
∫ −−−=
max
min
)())](1(exp[1
S
S
SHf dxxfxFtp ρ                                     (10) 
The term ))](1(exp[ xFt H−−ρ  in the integral gives the probability that none of the hazard 
occurrences in the time interval 0,t will exceed resistance with magnitude x.  
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With reducing the time of exposure t, the probability ))](1(exp[ xFt H−−ρ  that the hazard 
magnitude will exceed resistance (the probability of failure) decreases significantly, which leads to a 
significant reduction of the probability of failure fp . 
If the process or action is conducted within a very small time interval 0≈t , the probability of 
failure tends to zero.  
011)(1lim
max
min
0
=−=−= ∫→
S
S
Sf
t
dxxfp                                             (11) 
This principle has a wide application to processes and operations affecting all areas of the human 
activity. Thus, if the overall duration of an operation is reduced, it is less likely to be disrupted (failed) 
by a random cause. Reducing the length of operation reduces significantly the probability of 
encountering a critical hazard. 
Consider an example from transportation. For road accidents following a homogeneous Poisson 
process with intensity ρ , along a road with length 1L , the probability of no road accident associated 
with the length 1L  is )exp( 11 Lp ρ−= . If the road length is increased by a factor of m ( 12 mLL = ), 
the probability of no accident will be )exp( 12 mLp ρ−= . Taking the ratio of the logarithms of these 
probabilities gives 
m
p
p
/1
ln
ln
2
1 =  
from which mpp )( 12 = . From the last expression, if for example, the probability of no road accident 
associated with road length 1L  is 9.01 =p , increasing the length of the road four times decreases the 
probability of no road accident to 66.09.0 4 = . Unlike short journeys, long journeys are likely to be 
affected by delays caused by road accidents. Consequently, for long journeys, a delay reflecting 
potential accidents should be added to the estimated overall time of the journey. 
Reducing risk by reducing the space of exposure 
Suppose that V is the volume of a component with complex shape subjected to a complex loading. Let 
λ  be the number density of the flaws which follow a homogeneous Poisson process in the stressed 
volume V. The probability that in the stressed volume V, there will be no critical flaws capable of 
causing failure is given by ]exp[ Lcrλ− . The number density of the critical flaws is ccr F×= λλ , 
where cF  is the probability that a single flaw will be critical, given that it resides in the stressed 
volume V. Consequently, the probability that the stressed component will not contain a critical flaw 
becomes ]exp[ cFV ×−λ  and the probability of failure of the component will be 
]exp[1 cf FVp ×−−= λ                                                        (12) 
The conditional probability cF  of failure of the stressed component given that a single flaw with 
random size resides in the volume V can be determined easily from a finite elements solution. 
Suppose that the stressed volume has been discretized into finite elements for each of which the 
maximum tensile stress is known. Suppose that the size distribution of the flaws is given by the 
cumulative distribution )(dF . The function )(dF  gives the probability that the size of a random 
flaw will not exceed a particular value d . The probability cF  that a single flaw will be critical, given 
that it resides in the stressed volume V, can be determined by the following algorithm: 
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Algorithm 
;0=cF  
For each finite element i do steps 1-5 
   1. Determine the maximum tensile stress σ  in the ith finite element; 
   2. Determine the critical flaw diameter id ,σ  beyond which failure will be  
         initiated by the maximal tensile stress σ ; 
   3. Determine the probability )(1 ,, iif dFp σ−=  that a flaw with random size will cause failure 
if it resides in finite element i 
   4. Determine the probability that a flaw with random size residing in the volume V will actually 
reside in the ith finite element and will cause failure: 
)](1[)/( ,, iiic dFVvp σ−×=  
   5. Accumulate the probability icp ,  into the total probability cF : iccc pFF ,+=  
 
The probability )](1[)/( ,, imiic dFVvp σ−×=  that a flaw with random size (given that it is in the 
stressed volume V) will reside in the ith finite element and will cause failure is given by the product of 
the probability Vvi /  that the flow will reside in the volume iv  of the ith finite element and the 
probability )(1 ,idF σ−  that its diameter will be larger than the critical flaw diameter id ,σ  causing 
failure under the maximum stress σ  characterising the ith finite element. Because a single flaw 
cannot be in the volume of more than one finite element, the probabilities icp ,  are added as 
probabilities of mutually exclusive events. 
At the end, the probability of failure of the component with complex shape and volume V is given 
by equation (12). 
If the volume is small ( 0≈V ), the probability of having a critical flaw in the volume V tends to 
zero: 
0)]exp(1[lim
0
=×−−=
→ cfV
FVp λ                                               (13) 
Now assume that the volume V has been discretised into n elements with the same volume 
nVv /= . Adding all elementary probabilities )](1[)/( ,, iic dFVvp σ−×=  gives: 
∑∑
==
−=−×=
n
i
i
n
i
ic dFn
dFVvF
1
,
1
, )](1[
1
))](1()/[( σσ                           (14) 
for the conditional probability that a flaw with random size will be critical, given that it resides in the 
stressed volume V. In words, the conditional probability of failure given that the flaw resides in the 
volume V is equal to the average of the conditional probabilities of failure given that the flaw resides 
sequentially in each of the elementary volumes. Substituting cF  in equation (12) gives the probability 
of failure of the component with complex shape. 
A typical example of limiting the technical risk of failure by reducing the space of exposure is 
reducing the length of a piece of wire in order to reduce the probability that a critical defect will be 
present. 
Another example is limiting the risk of an error in a long chain of the same type of calculations. 
Assuming that the errors follow a Poisson distribution, if λ  is the number of errors per unit number 
of calculations, the probability of an error associated with the total number of calculations N is given 
by )exp(1 Np f λ−−= . Reducing the number of calculations N, dramatically reduces the probability 
fp  of a calculation error. 
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INTRODUCING INVERSE STATES 
Inverse states cancelling the anticipated state with a negative impact or acting as 
counter-balancing forces 
An inverse state of the anticipated negative impact state can be used to compensate the negative 
effect. The two states superpose and the result is an absence or a significantly attenuated negative 
effect.  
In acoustics, this principle works in noise-cancellation headphones designed for reducing the risk 
of hearing damage caused by noise. A sound wave is emitted with the same amplitude but with 
inverted phase to the noise. The result is a significant attenuation of the harmful noise and reduced 
risk of hearing damage.  
This principle also underlies active methods of controlling vibration. The active vibration control 
involves suitable vibration sensors (e.g. accelerometers), controllers and actuators for vibration 
control. The signal from the vibration sensors is fed to a controller and through an actuator, a 
spectrum of cancellation vibrations are generated in response. The advances in the sensor, actuator 
and computer technology made active methods of control cost-effective and affordable. 
Deliberate inverse states cancelling negative anticipated effects is at the heart of many 
temperature-compensation circuits designed to mitigate the impact of generated heat on the 
parameters of the electronic devices. For example, creating inverse states through a Wheatstone 
bridge cancels the negative effect from temperature and is the foundation of various measurement 
techniques characterised by a small error. 
In mechanical engineering, a typical example is the compensation clock pendulum in which the 
temperature elongation of the pendulum rod is counteracted by an opposite expansion so that the 
period of oscillation remains the same. A typical application of an inverse state as a counterbalancing 
force are the counterweights in cranes which reduce  the loading on the lifting motor and improve the 
balance and stability of the crane. Another example is the gate valve which is maintained open by a 
hydraulic pressure acting against a counterbalancing compression spring. Upon failure of the 
hydraulic system, the counterbalancing spring expands and returns the valve in closed (safe) position.  
 
Inverse states buffering the anticipated state with a negative impact 
Introducing an inverse state which serves as a buffer can be done in many cases where a negative 
effect has been anticipated and the inverse state is provided for buffering the impact of the anticipated 
negative effect. 
This technique underlies reducing the risk of failure of zones generating heath. Components 
working in close contact (e.g. piston-cylinder) and moving relative to each other generate heat which, 
if not dissipated, causes intensive wear, reduced strength and deformations. The risk of failure of such 
an assembly is reduced significantly if one of the parts (e.g. the cylinder) is cooled to dissipate the 
released heat which reduces the friction and wear. 
The cold expansion, used in aviation for creating compressive stresses at the surface of fastener 
holes (Figure 4) is another example of using buffering inverse states. 
 
 
Figure 4. Countering the stress-concentration effect of a hole by creating compressive stresses 
through cold expansion. 
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This is done by passing a tapered mandrel through the hole. The inverse state created in the vicinity of 
the hole (compressive residual stress field), counters the tensile loading stresses during operation and 
impedes the formation of fatigue cracks at the edge of the hole and their propagation which reduces 
the risk of fatigue failure. 
Another way of introducing an inverse state through plastic deformation is the process of pre-
setting used in spring manufacturing. For compression springs for example, pre-setting consists of 
inducing a permanent plastic deformation of the spring, which reduces the length of the spring and 
results in a compressive residual stress at the surface of the spring wire. During loading, the 
compressive residual stress at the spring surface is subtracted from the tensile stress from loading. The 
result is a smaller stress range and increased fatigue life of the pre-set spring. 
In order to counter the tensile stresses from loading at the surface and improve fatigue resistance, 
shot-peening, introducing compressive stresses at the surface, has been used as an important element 
of the manufacturing technology (Niku-Lari, 1981; Bird & Saynor, 1984). As a result of this 
operation, the fatigue life of leaf springs for example, can be increased up to 10 times. 
In the construction industry, the pre-tensioned concrete is a typical example of buffering the 
negative effect by introducing an inverse state. The tensile stresses from bending of concrete beams 
can be reduced if pre-loaded in tension tendons (steel cables or rods) are inserted in the beam to 
provide a clamping load. After the concrete sets, the beam is pre-loaded in compression. The 
compressive stress from pre-loading is an inverse state which compensates the tensile loading 
stresses. Since the tensile stresses from bending superpose with the compressive residual stresses, the 
effective stress during service is compressive or a significantly reduced tensile stress. Pre-stressed 
concrete is the main material for floors in high-rise buildings. In addition, pre-stressing makes it possible 
to construct larger spans in bridges and buildings with large column-free spaces. 
An inverse state of compressive residual stresses at the surface, acting as a buffer compensating 
the tensile service stresses from loading, can also be created by a special heat- and thermochemical 
treatment such as case-hardening, gas-carburising and gas-nitriding.  
The corrosion, erosion and wear allowances added to the computed sections of pipes are other 
examples of inverse states anticipating the loss of wall thickness. They act as buffers compensating 
for the loss of wall thickness and decrease significantly the risk of failure. 
The use of inverse states as a buffer has a wide application in many other areas of human activity. 
In project management, providing time buffers for certain critical tasks reduces the risk of a delay 
should particular risks materialise. Similarly, in managing stock in the presence of random demands, 
increasing the reserve of a particular safety-critical stock (e.g. particular life-saving medicine) reduces 
the risk of running out of stock in case of clustering of random demands. 
Increasing the financial reserves of a bank or a company makes it less vulnerable to depleting its 
reserves due to materialised credit and market risks. 
Inverting the relative position of objects the motion of objects and the direction of flows 
There are cases where inverting the relative position of objects eliminates a detrimental effect from 
a third factor. Drilling vertical blind holes in components, by a robot, on a manufacturing line for 
example is associated with the need for cleaning the blind holes from metal chips. If the hole is drilled 
on the component positioned upside-down, the problem associated with cleaning the hole from chips 
is eliminated because gravity now helps to clean the hole. 
Often making a moving object stationary and moving the stationary object in the opposite direction 
(inverting the motion) results in a significantly improved performance and risk reduction. This is the 
idea behind the Cosworth® sand casting process where the molten metal is never poured down into 
the sand mold as is the case in the classical sand casting process. It flows into the opposite direction 
(uphill) into the mold which eliminates turbulence and reduces the risk of trapping oxides into the 
metal which would reduce significantly the fatigue strength of the product. 
Inverse states can even be used to reduce the costs associated with multiple source-destination 
connecting paths in transportation networks, supply networks, communication networks and support 
networks. Reducing these costs is associated with reducing the waste of energy, the cost of delivering 
a particular commodity or a service, the level of congestion and environmental pollution. The next 
example in the area of logistic supply is a unexpected application of this principle. 
Figure 5 features a logistic supply network where a particular commodity is delivered from the 
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three interchangeable sources s1,s2 and s3 to the destinations t1,t2 and t3. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Draining closed parasitic flow loops in logistic supply networks 
 
As a result, a closed parasitic flow loop essentially appears between nodes 3,4,10 and 3 despite that 
the transported commodity does not travel along a closed contour. Closed parasitic flow loops are 
cyclic paths where the flow essentially travels in the direction of traversal (Figure 5a, the flow loop 
3,4,10,3). By draining the parasitic flow loop by augmenting the cyclic path 3,4,10,3 with flow in 
opposite direction, the flow loop is eliminated (Figure 5b). As a result, value is derived from 
significantly reducing the transportation losses and risk of congestion without affecting the throughput 
flow from the interchangeable sources s1,s2 and s3 to the destinations t1,t2 and t3. 
Parasitic flow loops are associated with increased risk of congestion and accidents, big wastage of 
energy, time, and increased levels of pollution to the environment. Parasitic flow loops exist in real 
transportation networks with a very high probability. Optimizing supply networks by draining highly 
undesirable parasitic flow loops derives significant value by reducing the transportation costs, the risk 
of congestion and accidents, and the environmental pollution. The result is billions of dollars saved to 
the world economy. 
The existence of parasitic flow loops in networks remained unnoticed by scientists for nearly 60 
years. Ironically, despite the years of intensive research on static flow networks, closed parasitic flow 
loops appear even in the “network flow solutions” from all published algorithms (including the 
famous Ford-Fulkerson algorithm; Ford and Fulkerson, 1956) for maximising the throughput flow in 
networks, since the creation of the theory of flow networks in 1956.  
The parasitic flow loops are not necessarily closed flow loops only. Flow loops, for which more 
than half of the cyclic path contains flow along a particular direction of traversal are also associated 
with significant transportation losses and risk of congestion. 
In Figure 6, three interchangeable sources s1,s2 and s3 are supplying a particular commodity or 
service to three destinations d1,d2 and d3. As a result, a parasitic flow loop 4,5,6,7,2,3,4 appears. The 
parasitic flow loop can be eliminated by augmenting the cyclic path 4,5,6,7,2,3,4 with flow in the 
opposite direction of the direction of the dominating flow. As a result, the parasitic flow loop 
disappears (Figure 6b) without affecting the throughput flow from the interchangeable sources to the 
destinations. 
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Figure 6.  Draining a parasitic flow loop (2,7,6,5,4,3,2) 
 
Interestingly, selecting the nearest available source does not guarantee an absence of 
parasitic flow loops. 
In the network in Figure 7a with interchangeable sources s1,s2,s3 servicing destinations 
d1,d2,d3, the nearest source to the destination d1 is s1, the nearest source to the destination 
d2 is s2 and the nearest remaining source to the destination d3 is s3. Each source can service not 
more than one destination. In addition, all of the source-destination pairs have been connected with 
the shortest paths. Despite the shortest-path selections, the obtained solution is far from 
optimal. A parasitic flow loop 12,8,3,6,5,11,12 is present and by augmenting it with flow in 
the opposite direction of the direction of the dominant flow, the new set of connections in 
Figure 7b appear where no parasitic flow loops are present. The throughput flow from the 
interchangeable sources s1,s2 and s3 to the destinations d1,d2 and d3 remains the same while 
the transportation costs have been reduced significantly. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Selecting the nearest available source does not guarantee an optimal solution. 
 
REDUCING RISK BY SEPARATION 
In general, it is difficult to optimise a single component carrying many functions with regard to every 
single function. Separating critical functions and properties is often the key to improving reliability 
and reducing technical risk. The separation principle can be discovered in the design of flexible pipes 
carrying hydrocarbons. The different layers in the flexible pipe are designed for different functions: to 
protect against external corrosion, to resist tensile loads, to resist radial loads resulting from internal 
pressure, to make the pipe leak-proof and to prevent collapse due to external pressure. It is difficult to 
optimise a homogeneous pipe with respect to each of these loads. The separate layers building the 
flexible pipe however can be optimised with respect to the function they carry. The result is increased 
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reliability of the pipe. Separating functions to different components relieves the load on components 
and reduces the risk of failure. 
The separation of functions is also used for mutual compensation of the deficiencies of 
manufacturing methods. A typical example is the hybrid joint combining an adhesive joint and 
mechanical fixing. There is clear separation of functions: the adhesive reduces the stress concentration 
along the joint while the mechanical fixing increases the peel resistance of the adhesive joint and its 
stiffness. 
This principle is also very useful in cases where reliability is balanced against weight and cost. 
Improving reliability only locally, where it matters saves resources and results in light-weight designs. 
Separating critical properties is often present in the design of complex alloys where some of the 
microstructural components provide resistance to wearout, while other components provide toughness 
(resistance to crack propagation). 
Often, the need for reducing the risk of failure requires different properties from the different parts 
of the component. Guaranteeing different properties at different parts of the components is the 
underlying principle behind coatings improving the wear resistance and corrosion resistance. The case 
hardening of components, which consists of a local induction heating of the surface layers followed 
by quenching, improves the surface resistance to large contact stresses and wear, while leaving the 
core tough which is necessary to withstand impact loads. 
This principle is often used in composite materials combining structural constituents with different 
properties in different directions. Concrete used in the construction industry is a material with good 
compressive strength but small tensile strength. The steel bars in reinforced concrete are placed in 
areas loaded in tension where the concrete cannot resist tensile stresses. 
The separation principle can also be used for mitigating the consequences from failure because an 
increased local reliability delays the propagation of damage to the rest of the component/structure. 
Thus, increasing the reliability of a fire door by additional fire-proof coating delays the fire escalation 
and limits the fire damage. 
The separation principle has a wide application. Reliable operation often depends on critical 
properties, events or factors not being present at the same time or in the same space region. Separating 
people from hazards is an important measure for reducing the damage if the control over the hazards 
is lost. A typical example of time separation of risk-critical factors is the traffic lights, preventing 
collision between intersecting flows of traffic and flows of pedestrians. Two incompatible risk-critical 
factors can be introduced simultaneously by transforming their action from continuous to periodic and 
inserting the action of one of the factors in the pauses of the other factor. 
Typical examples of space separation of risk-critical factors is the separation of intersecting flows 
of traffic and flows of pedestrians at different levels which seliminates the risk of collisions and 
accidents.  
Limiting the spread of infection by urgent quarantine measures isolating infected individuals is 
another example of the space separation principle. 
Application of the separation principle for blocking a common cause 
A common-cause failure is usually due to a single cause with multiple failure effects which are not 
consequences from one another (Billinton and Allan, 1992). A common cause reduces the reliability 
of a number of components simultaneously. The affected components are then more likely to fail, 
which reduces the overall system reliability. 
Typical conditions promoting common cause failures are: common design faults, common 
manufacturing faults, common installation and assembly faults, common maintenance faults, shared 
environmental stresses by several components: for example high temperature, pressure, humidity, 
erosion, corrosion, vibration, radiation, dust, electromagnetic radiation, impacts and shocks. Common 
cause may also be due to: a common power supply, common communication channels, a common 
piece of software, etc. Thus, two programmable devices produced by different manufacturers, 
assembled and installed by different people can still suffer a common cause if the same faulty piece of 
software code has been installed in the devices. 
Maintenance and operating actions common to different components is a major source of common-
cause failures. Software routines written by the same person/team often exhibit common faults. 
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Acceleration stresses leading to accumulation of damage and fast wearout are typical examples of 
common causes. Examples of acceleration stresses are the temperature, humidity, cycling, vibration, 
speed, pressure, voltage, current, concentration of particular ions, etc. This list is only a sample of 
possible acceleration stresses and can be extended. Because acceleration stresses lead to a faster 
wearout, they entail a higher propensity to failure for groups of components which reduces the overall 
system reliability. 
A typical example of this type of common cause failures is the high temperature which increases 
the susceptibility to deterioration of a group of electronic components. By simultaneously increasing 
the hazard rates of the affected components, the probability of system failure is increased. Humidity, 
corrosion or vibrations increase the joint probability of failure of the affected components and shorten 
the system’s life. Even in blocks with a high level of built-in redundancy, in case of a common cause, 
all redundant components in the block may fail within a short period of time and the advantage from 
the built-in redundancy is lost. 
Failure to account for the acceleration stresses acting as common causes usually leads to optimistic 
reliability predictions - the actual reliability is smaller than the predicted. 
In many cases, the separation principle helps in blocking out common causes thereby reducing the 
risk of failure. 
Separating the components at distances greater than the radius of influence of a common cause is 
an efficient way of reducing the risks from common-cause failures.  
Thus, separating large fuel containers at safe distances from one another prevents cascading 
explosions initiated by the explosion of one of the containers. Separating two or more communication 
centres at distances greater than the radius of destruction of a missile increases the probability of 
survival of at least one of the centres. Multiple back-ups of the same vital piece of information kept in 
different places protects against the loss of information in case of fire, theft or sabotage. 
Another implementation of this principle is the separation of vital control components from a 
component whose failure could inflict damage. A typical example is separating the control lines at 
safe distances from the aeroplane jet engines. In case of engine explosion, the flight controls will still 
be operational which will permit a safe landing of the plane. Separating the redundant components by 
insulating from contact with an environment characterised by excessive dust, humidity, heath or 
vibrations, is also an efficient way of protecting against a common cause failure. 
Providing maintenance of redundant components by separate operators reduces the likelihood of 
common cause failure due to faulty maintenance. 
Separating the physical principles on the basis of which redundant devices operate provides 
diversity in design and is a very efficient way of blocking out a common cause and reducing common 
cause failures. The idea is to prevent several components from being affected by the same common 
cause. If two cooling pumps (a main pump and an emergency pump) participate in cooling of a 
chemical reactor, failure of both pumps creates an emergency situation. If the two cooling devices are 
from different manufactures or operate on different physical principles, the common cause faults will 
be blocked out. For redundant cooling devices if one of them is powered by electricity and the other 
uses natural gravitation to operate, the common cause "absence of power supply" will be blocked out. 
If, in addition, the two cooling devices are serviced/maintained by different operators, the common 
cause 'faulty maintenance' will also be blocked out. Similarly, a common cause due to an incorrect 
calibration of measuring instruments can be avoided if the calibration is done by separate operators. If 
finally, the cooling devices are separated in different rooms, the common cause failure due to fire will 
also be blocked out. 
Sundararajan (1991) suggests preliminary common-cause analysis which consists of identifying all 
possible common causes to which the system is exposed and their potential effects. The purpose is to 
alert risk analysts to potential problems. 
Avoiding common links which can be affected by a common cause is an efficient way of blocking 
out common causes. Such are for example the common location for components, the common storage 
of data, etc. The destruction of all communication lines due to accident or vandalism can be avoided 
by avoiding placing all of the communication lines in a common conduit. A common cause failure 
due to a software bug for example, can be avoided if an alternative algorithm and implementation are 
provided for the same task or if a separate team is involved in developing the same piece of software 
independently. 
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Separating investment in unrelated sectors protects against a common cause failure which reduces 
simultaneously the return from all sectors (e.g. agricultural sectors simultaneously affected by bad 
weather or disease, consumer sectors simultaneously affected by a health scare, investments in 
different sectors in a country affected by a political crisis, economic crisis, social unrest, etc. 
REDUCING RISK BY SEGMENTATION 
Segmentation reduces risk by (i) improving the load distribution, (ii) reducing the vulnerability to a 
single failure, (iii) reducing the damage escalation and (iv) limiting the hazard potential. 
Segmentation improves the load distribution 
Consider a flange with very few fasteners. A flange connection with a very small number of fasteners 
leads to excessive stresses in some of the fasteners. Segmentation involving an increased number of 
fasteners improves the load distribution and reliability. 
A significant reliability increase can be achieved if the load is distributed upon many load-carrying 
units. Thus, the load capacity of a V-belt cannot be increased by increasing its thickness because of 
increased bending stresses and big hysteresis losses overheating the belt. The load-carrying capacity 
and reliability however can be increased significantly by multiple parallel V-belts. 
Segmentation reduces the vulnerability to a single failure 
Segmentation also decreases vulnerability to a single failure. Consider again a flange with very few 
fasteners. Failure of a single fastener is very likely to cause a loss of containment. A flange with a 
larger number of fasteners will not be vulnerable to a single failure or even several failures. 
Failure of one of the multiple parallel V-belts will not cause failure of the transmission system. 
Similarly, failure of a single wire in a rope built by twisting many wire strands will not normally 
cause failure of the rope. 
Segmentation reduces the damage escalation 
Segmentation also helps reduce the damage escalation and the consequences given that failure has 
occurred. Segmenting a pipe into many separate sealed segments helps limit the damage from a 
propagating crack within a single segment only, which reduces significantly the consequences from 
failure.  
Crack arrestors can be strips or rings made of tougher material (Figure 8a). The mechanism of 
crack arrest consists of reducing the strain energy flow to the crack tip upon encountering a tougher 
material strip. In Figure 8b, the crack is arrested at the edge of the pipeline section. Segmentation in 
this case does not prevent cracks from becoming unstable, it only limits the extent of damage once the 
damage has started escalating. In this case, segmentation reduces risk by limiting the consequences of 
failure. 
Another example of the segmentation principle can be given with buckling of a pipeline subjected to 
a high external hydrostatic pressure. Buckling could be eliminated by increasing the thickness of the 
pipeline but this option is associated with significant costs. Control of buckling propagation achieved 
by using buckle arrestors is a cheaper and more preferable option. Buckle arrestors are thick steel 
rings welded to or attached at regular intervals to the pipeline in order to halt the propagating buckle 
and confine damage to a relatively small section (Figure 8a). In this way, the losses from buckling are 
limited to the length of the section between two buckle arrestors. In case of failure, only the buckled 
section will be cut and replaced. The spacing between buckle arrestors can be optimised on the basis 
of a cost-benefit balance between the cost of installation of the arrestors and the expected cost of 
intervention and repair. 
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Figure 8. A segmented pipeline with crack arresters of type stiffened welded rings 
 
The segmentation principle can be used for reducing risk in a wide range of applications.  
Segmentation is used to increase the resistance of a ship to flooding. The volume of the hull is 
divided into watertight compartments. If the flooding is localised, only one or very few compartments 
are affected which allows the ship to retain buoyancy. Segmentation of the corridors in a building, 
with fireproof doors, protects against the fast escalation of fire. 
Segmentation can be used to prevent the spread of infectious diseases. Such is the purpose of 
preventing formations of large gatherings of people in case of infectious disease. 
. 
Segmentation limiting the hazard potential 
Segmentation can be applied with success to limit the amount of energy possessed by hazards which 
limits their potential to cause harm. Thus, processing small (segmented) volumes of toxic substances 
at a time reduces the hazard potential of the substance and the risk of poisoning, in case of accidental 
spillage. Preventing the formation of large build-ups of snow, water, overheated water vapour etc., 
reduces both the likelihood of an accident and its destructive power should it occur. 
CONCLUSIONS 
System risk can be reduced at no extra cost by appropriate permutations of interchangeable 
components/operations. To achieve a maximum risk reduction in systems with a series-parallel logical 
arrangement, components or operations of similar reliability must be located on a single branch. 
The risk associated with processes and operations can be reduced significantly by reducing the 
time and space of exposure. Closed-form expressions with a wide application domain have been 
presented to quantify the impact of the time of exposure and space of exposure. 
The risk of failure in many areas of the human activity can be effectively reduced simply by 
introducing inverse states countering anticipated negative effects during service. In logistic supply 
networks, the application of this principle leads to a significant reduction of the risk of congestion and 
delays. The reduction of transportation costs and the environmental pollution has the potential to save 
billions of dollars to the world economy. 
Separation is a generic principle for reducing risk which is particularly efficient in separating 
functions to be carried out by different components. This relieves the load on components, permits 
optimisation with respect to the carried function and reduces the risk. The separation principle is also 
very important for blocking out a common cause. 
Segmentation is a generic principle for risk reduction that can be applied with success to reduce 
risk in many areas of the human activity. It is particularly efficient in improving the load distribution, 
reducing vulnerability to a single failure, reducing the hazard potential and damage escalation. 
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